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Abstract: Habermas’ idea of the public sphere as a space 
where members of society can develop discussions and 
debates on public issues has inspired some scholars to 
interpret the modern development of Muslim societies. 
The spread of communication technology that includes 
print and electronic media, has paved the way for the 
emergence of the public sphere in those societies. Several 
studies of Indonesian Islam by western scholars also pay 
attention to the public sphere. Having discussed those 
studies, this paper argues that, although Habermas’ very 
notion of the public sphere has been criticised and 
modified by the scholars, it can be used effectively and 
developed for further research on Indonesian Islam.   
Keywords: Public Sphere, Indonesian Islam, Public 
Culture, Reasoning. 
Introduction 
Habermas’ idea of the public sphere—originally discussed in his 
book on the development of the public sphere in Europe is an 
important contribution to recent social studies.1 What he means by 
“public sphere” is apparently a space where members of society could 
develop discussions and debates on public issues face-to-face or 
through modern media.2  The idea of public sphere has inspired some 
                                                 
1 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrance. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).  
2 I fail to find a clear definition of public sphere by Habermas. However, Charles 
Taylor’s following definition is probably helpful: It is “a common space in which 
members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic 
and also face-to-face encounter; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be 
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scholars to understand the modern development of Muslim societies.3 
According to these scholars, the widespread of communication 
technology that includes print and electronic media, has paved the way 
for the emergence of public sphere in Muslim societies.  
Some scholars studying Indonesian Islam are also interested in 
looking at the development of public sphere in the country. In what 
follows, I will review the existing relevant studies on Indonesian Islam 
and analyse them through the scholarly critical discussion on 
Habermas’ public sphere. This analysis will hopefully open more 
possibilities to study Indonesian Islam in a better perspective.  
Indonesian Muslim Media 
There are some studies on Muslim media in Indonesia. Only a few 
of them, however, explicitly employ the idea of public sphere in their 
analysis. Almost all of the studies pay attention to the media produced 
by the reformists and hardliners. The latter type of media has attracted 
some researchers especially since 1990s.  
The study of al-Muslimun magazine by Federspiel is probably one 
of the early studies of modern Muslim media in Indonesia.4 The al-
Muslimun belongs to a reformist Muslim organization called Persatuan 
Islam that is based in Bandung of West Java.5 Compared to another 
reformist Muslim organization called “Muhammadiyah”, Persatuan Islam 
more strongly promotes the idea of purification of Islam from its 
syncretic elements and the return to the scripture and the prophetic 
tradition.6 In this study Federspiel concentrates on the issues of the 
magazine published between 1954 and 1960. The focus of the study is 
a section of the magazine called “question and answer” (sual-djawab) in 
which the editors of the magazine answer specific questions from the 
                                                                                                      
able to form a common mind about this.” See Charles Taylor, “Modernity and the Rise 
of the Public Sphere,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 14 (1993), p. 220.   
3 Dale F Eickelman and John Anderson, “Redefining Muslim Publics,” in Dale F. 
Eickelman and John Anderson (eds), New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public 
Sphere (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 203. 
4 Howard M Federspiel, “The Political and Social Language of Indonesian Muslims: 
The Case of al-Muslimun,” Indonesia, 38 (1984), pp, 55-73. 
5 Persatuan Islam also has activities in Bangil, East Java. 
6 For a more comprehensive study of the Persatuan Islam, see Howard M. Federspiel, 
Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: the Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) 1923-1957 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001).. 
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readers regarding religious matters. In other words, the “question and 
answer” section is actually a place for giving fatwa>s.   
In Federspiel’s description of the contents of the question and 
answer section we find that there are some fatwa> challenging the 
existing Islamic traditional practices, such as the fatwa > on the practice 
of instructing the deceased to help the person answer the questions of 
Angels on religious beliefs in a funeral ritual called “talqīn,” and the 
holding of the ritual meal (slametan) during an eclipse of the moon. 
According to the editors of the magazine, these practices are 
unacceptable accretions (bid‘ah). The magazine also discusses how 
Muslims should interact with other identified groups: the Jews and the 
Christians (ahl al-kitāb), the Chinese, the Communists and the 
Nationalists. Most of the attitudes prescribed by the magazine are 
friendly and tolerant except to the communists because “the 
Communist Party is dedicated to principles that are anti-religious and 
against Islam.”7  However, Federspiel does not further elaborate this 
interaction. This leads us to question: what was the response of the 
traditionalist religious authorities to the challenge prompted by al-
Muslimun? Was there any discussion and debate between these two 
groups in seminars and print media? Was there any reaction of the 
Christians, the Chinese, the Communists and the Nationalists to the 
position taken by al-Muslimun? It seems that these questions do not 
bother Federspiel because his purpose in the article is not to see public 
discussions and debates illustrated by the magazine but only to show 
that there is a pure and non-syncretic Islamic discourse in Indonesia.8  
Unlike Federspiel’s study, the later studies of Muslim media try to 
see the position of the opponent of the media in question. Liddle’s 
article on Media Dakwah magazine9 and Hefner’s study of Media 
Dakwah versus Republika10 clearly demonstrate how opposite 
                                                 
7 Federspiel, “The Political and Social Language," p. 66. 
8 Ibid, p. 55. 
9 William R. Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political 
Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia,” in Mark R. Woodward (ed.), Toward a 
New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought (Tempe: Arizona State 
University, 1996). 
10 Robert W Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among 
Indonesian Muslims,” Indonesia, 64 (1997), pp. 77-103. 
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interpretations of Islam and their political contexts have been reflected 
in the media.11 In his article, Liddle discusses two opposite 
interpretations of Islam in Indonesia. He categorizes them as the 
‘substantialist’ versus the ‘scripturalist.’ The former refers to the 
renewal movement pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid since 1970s12 
while the latter refers to Media Dakwah and its proponents. According 
to Liddle, the substantialist group holds the idea that faith and ethics 
are more important than formal adherence to Islam. Therefore, this 
group is more open and tolerant to differences and reject the necessity 
of founding an Islamic state. The scripturalist group, on the other 
hand, aspires to the idea of Islamic state and considers those who 
disagree with them as the enemies of Islam. Apart from the fact that 
Liddle’s dichotomy has been criticized of being rather simplistic,13 it 
helps understand the Media Dakwah’s account of its opponents.  
In his discussion, Liddle traces the socio-political background of 
the contest between the substantialist and the scripturalist. Media 
Dakwah is a monthly magazine published by Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia (DDII/Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation), 
established in 1967 by Muhammad Natsir, a leading Muslim politician 
of Masyumi party that was banned by Sukarno in 1960.14 Natsir and his 
proponents basically aspire to Islam as an ideology of the Indonesian 
state. Because of this, Suharto government had tried to suppress and 
restrict this group. Meanwhile, the substantialist group, who promote 
the idea of separating Islam from political parties, is more favourable 
to the government. Thus, it is not surprising, argues Liddle, that the 
substantialist ideas had been more widely covered by media than those 
                                                 
11 There is another study of Media Dakwah, which focuses on how the magazine repre-
sents its opponents, especially Nurcholish Madjid, in the framework of a Jewish and 
Christian conspiracy. See Ade Armando (1993). Armando argues that Media Dakwah’s 
coverage is best described as propaganda rather than a press account. This study 
reminds us that the existence of a print media does not necessarily lead to a healthy 
dialogue between conflicting parties. 
12 For a study of this movement, see Muhammad Kamal Hasan, Muslim Intellectuals 
Responses to ‘New Order’ Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka, 1982). 
13 See for instance Hefner, “Print Islam," note 16. 
14 For a study of DDII, see Asna Husin, "Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of 
Da‘wah: A Study of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia," (Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Columbia University, 1998).   
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of the scripturalists.15 Thus, it is very possible that the animosity of the 
scripturalists toward the substantialists reflected in Media Dakwah 
account in 1991-92 is partly because of the political difficulties 
experienced by the former before 1990s. Liddle eventually argues that 
if the political situation changes, especially after the resignation of 
Suharto, the substantialist view will not necessarily win more 
supporters that that of the scripturalist.    
Hefner, more than Liddle’s study, discusses the socio-political 
context of Media Dakwah and its relation to Republika, a newspaper 
associated with Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI (the 
Association of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals). Unlike Liddle, Hefner 
explicitly refers to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. The contest 
between Media Dakwah and Republika, argues Hefner, “illustrates the 
centrality of print media in the struggle for public opinion in the 
Muslim world and the obstacles to developing an open and pluralistic 
‘public sphere’ in situations of authoritarian control.”16  
To understand the position of Media Dakwah, like Liddle, Hefner 
discusses in quite some detail the historical and political backgrounds 
of the DDII. Against these backgrounds, Hefner observes that the 
message of the magazine is “adamantly anti-humanist and anti-liberal” 
and portrays Islam as “the uncompromising truth.” More importantly, 
Hefner also tries to find the readerships of Media Dakwah and 
concludes that “the typical Media Dakwah reader resides in or just 
outside a city, comes from ranks of the educated lower-middle class or 
working poor and has developed an interest in the magazine as a result 
of a personal identification with Masyumi or participation in DDII 
predication.”17 In contrast, Republika newspaper tries to attract a wider 
audience, especially the middle and upper urban middle class. 
Republika, therefore, features arts, television, literature and fashion 
                                                 
15 An important Indonesian magazine, Tempo, has been strongly supportive to Madjid’s 
renewal movement since 1970s. Tempo is non-confessional and secular magazine whose 
readerships mostly come from middle and upper class. M. Deden Ridwan has studied 
how Tempo has been involved in promoting Madjid’s renewal ideas and his proponents, 
see M. Deden Ridwan, Neo-Modernisme Islam dalam Wacana Tempo dan Kekuasaan (Jakarta: 
Belukar, 2002). The book, however, does not sufficiently discuss the relations between 
Tempo and the New Order government and overlooks the importance of Islamic 
Student Association [HMI] network within the staffs and editors of Tempo. 
16 Hefner, “Print Islam," p. 79-80. 
17 Ibid, p. 91. 
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trends as well as the idea that Islam is in favour of pluralism and 
tolerance.  
The contrast between the DDII supporters of Media Dakwah and 
Republika eventually led to successive protests by the former. The 
DDII supporters said that it is unacceptable that Republika releases 
some features of art performances that are very ‘un-Islamic,’ covered 
the stories on Shi>‘ī social and political thought and praised the liberal 
ideas of Ahmad Wahib, one of the exponents of Madjid’s renewal 
movement in 1970s.18 Another important clash between the two 
groups was about the coverage of the attack on the PDI (Indonesian 
Democratic Party) headquarter known as Suharto’s strategy to expel 
Megawati from her leadership of the party. Although earlier report in 
Republika on the accident was more sympathetic to the government 
position, the later government political manoeuvre to accuse a student 
leftist-oriented organization called Partai Rakyat Demokratik, PRD 
(People Democratic Party) of being the mastermind behind the riot, 
and as a communist front group, eventually led the editors of Republika 
to make a more balanced account. The DDII supporters went on 
demonstration to Republika office and protested that Republika was in 
favour of communism. Afterwards, Media Dakwah covered this 
demonstration and released some articles attacking the communists as 
the enemy of Islam and the state. Hefner observes that many of his 
informants believe that this action against Republika was engineered by 
anti-reform faction in the intelligent services in cooperation with 
DDII. This incident seems to illustrate what Hefner said in the 
beginning of this study that an authoritarian state can be a great 
obstacle to the development of an ideal public sphere. 
After the fall of Suharto in 1998 with the increasing freedom of 
press, there have been a significant number of publications of print 
and electronic media in Indonesia. One type of the media emerges in 
this period is those published by the Islamic militants. Hefner carried 
out a study of media released by an Islamic militant group called Forum 
Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljamaah, FKAWJ (Communication Forum 
for the Followers of Tradition and Community of the Prophet) that 
established a paramilitary group called Laskar Jihad to fight the 
                                                 
18 On Ahmad Wahib, see A. H. Johns, “An Islamic System or Islamic Values? Nucleus 
of a Debate in Contemporary Indonesia,” in William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political 
Economy of Meaning (Berkeley: Univesity of California, 1987).  
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Christians in the conflict area of Maluku island. Like in the previous 
study, Hefner explicitly refers to Habermas’ public sphere and argues 
that “literature on public sphere has provided a useful reminder that 
the social preconditions for democratisation include not just 
countervailing powers (although they are important too), but a culture 
that embraces pluralism and elaborates the terms for public 
participation.”19 The “culture that embraces pluralism,” however, 
cannot be found in FKAWJ media. Thus, Hefner maintains that 
“modern communications and associations can also be used to exclude 
minorities and promote public cultures that are anything but civil 
democratic.”20              
FKAWJ was established in 1998 by Ja’far Umar Thalib, an 
Indonesian of Hadrami-Arab and Madurese parentage. Thalib is a 
leader who has rich experience in the Middle East: studying in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen and getting involved in jiha>d in Afghanistan. In 
1994, Thalib founded an Islamic school called Jama‘ah Ihya’ al-Sunnah 
(Community for Reviving the Prophetic Tradition) in Yogyakarta for 
young adults, especially the university students. A year later, some 
Thalib’s students created a publication called Salafy, thanks to the new 
desktop-publishing technologies. With the rise of the internet cafés in 
Indonesia, some graduate students of the Ihya’ al-Sunnah living in 
different cities used this media to communicate each other, including 
for layout work and editing of the Salafy. The use of media became 
more intense among FKAWJ activists especially when the organization 
established its paramilitary wing, Laskar Jihad, in 2000. Hefner found 
the evidence that Thalib received political and financial supports, for 
different reasons, from the Indonesian National army officers for 
Laskar Jihad operations in Ambon. By this time, Laskar Jihad 
established a website at www.laskarjihad.org in which photo galleries 
of alleged Christian atrocities, daily news reports on the fighting and 
                                                 
19 Robert W. Hefner, “Civic Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in 
Indonesia,” in Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (eds), New Media in the Muslim 
World: The Emerging Public Sphere, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2003), p. 159. 
20 Hefner, "Civic Pluralism Denied?," 160. There is another interesting study, written 
in a journalist style, about Sabili, a magazine, which also promotes an exclusivist view 
of Islam vis-à-vis Christian minorities and the West. See Agus Muhammad, “Jihad 
Lewat Tulisan: Kisah Sukses Majalah Sabili dengan Beragam Ironi,” Pantau. July, no. 
015 (2001), or  www.pantau.or.id. 
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stories of other jihadi groups around the world. Laskar Jihad activists 
also used the internet to send daily reports on the Maluku fight to each 
of its branches. The reports were downloaded and then printed out on 
two sided paper entitled Maluku Hari Ini (Maluku Today) and 
distributed to the public. In addition, Laskar Jihad publishes a weekly 
bulletin called Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal-jamaah with full of 
photos and advertisements. The change of political climate in 2002, 
however, had pushed Thalib and Laskar Jihad to the margin, especially 
after the Bali bomb on October 12, 2002. Under a great pressure of 
the former military supporters, only three days after the bombing, 
Thalib dissolved the paramilitary group and closed their website. 
Hefner concludes: 
Elite support and the skilful use of media technologies had 
allowed Laskar Jihad to outflank Indonesia’s mainstream 
Muslim organizations. In so doing, the Laskar Jihad had 
challenged their moral vision and scaled up a militantly 
anti-Christian and anti-pluralist interpretation of Islam…-
[But] media savvy alone could not save them when some in 
the shadowy coalition of which they had been a part 
concluded that the Laskar Jihad had become a political 
liability.21 
Public Culture, Reasoning and Art  
There are other studies focusing not only on media per se but also 
and more importantly on public participations and discussions. The 
works of Robert W. Hefner and John R. Bowen are probably good 
examples of this kind of study. 
In his Civil Islam, Hefner argues that “in many respects, what is 
happening in the Muslim World resembles what the German 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas described some years ago as the 
emergence of the ‘public sphere’ in the West.” Although Hefner agrees 
with some critiques of Habermas’ idealized public sphere model, he 
contends that “Habermas’s analysis has the virtue of emphasizing that 
democratic life depends not just on government but on resources and 
habit in society at large”.22 Hefner argues that among Indonesian 
society there have been some important Islamic intellectuals with 
                                                 
21 Hefner, "Civic Pluralism Denied?," p. 175. 
22 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratisation in Indonesia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 11; idem., “Public Islam and the Problem of 
Democratization,” Sociology of Religion 62 (2001): pp. 491-514. 
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voluntary organization backgrounds (the most frequently mentioned 
are Nurcholish Madjid, a former leader of Muslim Student Association 
and the founder of Paramadina Foundation and Abdurrahman Wahid 
of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama) who have played the role in 
promoting democratic values in the country. These intellectuals 
contend that the modern ideals of equality, freedom and democracy 
are in line with Muslim ideals. The Islamic justification of democracy 
can be considered ambiguous by those who see that religion should 
not play a public role in a true democratic society. According to 
Hefner, in Islamic context, however, this justification is important not 
only to establish a new public ethic, but also to compete with the 
conservative notion that Islam is opposed to democracy.23 Thus, the 
public ethic promoted by the Muslim intellectuals in Islamic terms and 
disseminated within Muslim voluntary associations will in turn pave 
the way for democracy. 
Democracy requires a non-coercive culture that encourages 
citizens to respect the rights of others as well as to cherish 
their own. This public culture depends on mediating 
institutions in which citizens develop habits of free speech, 
participation and toleration. In all this, they say, there is 
nothing undemocratic about Muslim voluntary associations 
(as well as those of other religions) playing a role in the 
public life of civil society as well as in personal ethics.24  
Hefner traces back the history of Islam in Indonesia since the 
period of Islamic kingdoms to the end of Suharto’s period and argues 
that the seed of civil society and civic values has developed since the 
Islamic kingdoms’ period. Hefner, however, does not deny the fact 
that there are some Muslims who aspire to an Islamic state; a group 
that he calls “statist” or “regimist” Islam. In contemporary Indonesia, 
this group comprises a minority.  Thus, in the tone of Casanova’s 
public religion theory,25 Hefner eventually concludes that: 
Despite thirty years of authoritarian rule, Indonesia today is 
witness to a remarkable effort to recover and amplify a 
                                                 
23 Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” p. 499. 
24 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 13   
25 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1994). 
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Muslim and Indonesian culture of tolerance, equality and 
civility. The proponents of civil Islam are a key part of this 
renaissance. Civil Muslims renounce the mythology of an 
Islamic state. Rather than relegating Islam to the realm of 
the private, however, they insist that there is a middle path 
between liberalism’s privatization and conservative Islam’s 
bully state. The path passes by way of a public religion that 
makes itself heard through independent associations, 
spirited public dialogue and the demonstrated decency of 
believers.26  
If Hefner in his description of Indonesian civil Islam, talks about 
“public culture,” John R. Bowen in his studies of Islam and law in 
Indonesia, proposes another concept, that is, “public reasoning.” 
Before defining what he means by public reasoning, Bowen refers to 
some liberal political theories advocated by John Rawls, Will Kymlicka 
and Joseph Raz who attempt to develop a political theory that can 
encompass the pluralistic societies. According to Bowen, “their 
strategies differ, but they all involve trying to arrive at a universal core 
of principles to which people in all societies can subscribe”.27 This 
tendency towards a universal core principle is influenced by the liberal 
assumption that there is a universal rationality with which all people 
can agree. In this regard, Habermas’ notion “that publicity and 
rationality are intrinsically linked” and that laws in early modern 
Europe “were understood to flow from a general public consensus” 
resonates the same tendency.28 
Based on his anthropological researches, Bowen finds that the 
universal assumption is contentious. In an article, Bowen said that he is 
more “interested in internal debates over fundamental questions of 
cultural values and political community and the processes of reasoning 
–rather than ‘reason’– and justification that defines those debates.”29 In 
the Indonesian context, according to Bowen: 
                                                 
26 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 218. 
27 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 11.  
28 John R. Bowen, “Legal Reasoning and Public Discourse in Indonesian Islam,” in 
Eickelman and Anderson (eds), New Media in the Muslim World, p. 81-2. 
29 John R. Bowen, Shari‘a, State and Social Norms in France and Indonesia (Leiden: ISIM, 
2001), p. 4. 
  
Mujiburrahman 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 02, December 2007 
366 
Public reasoning retains its foundation in comprehensive 
doctrines, and in particular its foundation in specific 
understandings of Islam and particular adat based 
conceptions of the world. The ensuing debates often 
concern the legitimacy, in Islamic terms, of efforts to 
interpret religious texts in such a way that they are 
compatible with other ideals, for example, that of equal 
treatment of men and women. In these instances, 
Indonesian Muslims in question endorse, not a political 
conception of justice as in Rawls, but a reasonable 
conception of justice that is public and also Islamic (Italics 
in original). 30 
Now, it seems that Bowen holds the same idea with Hefner’s 
argument that Indonesian Muslims look to religious interpretations by 
the intellectuals to accept democratic values. However, Bowen’s 
argument is more than that, because for him public reasoning includes 
“many kind of reasoning processes about justice and rights that 
contain implications for basic structures of society, and that one finds 
across all level of society, articulated by village leaders, jurists and 
judges, national political figures, social activists, and by other ordinary 
people.”31 Thus, Bowen’s participants of the public reasoning include 
different people of different statuses among Indonesian population. 32 
In his exploration of the public reasoning on Islam and law in 
Indonesia, Bowen finds that people develop different arguments and 
strategies to answer certain questions. One of the questions is the 
                                                 
30 Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, p. 11-2. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Bowen also advocates a similar idea when he discusses Habermas’s idea of “public” 
and “public opinion” in the context of Asia: Yet in Asia the institutional settings for 
developing public identities have been quite different. In some cases –north India, 
central Java, urban China– new ‘public sphere’ initially were elite rather than bourgeois, 
and grew out of older, shared literate culture…But schools, courtrooms and offices –
all highly replicable institutions– have provided settings for the emergence of more 
generally shared identities, perceptions and sentiments across the canvas of colonial 
and post-colonial spaces, as have religious assemblies and party rallies. In these settings 
much more than literacy and print involved: classroom interactions, courtroom 
dialogues, politicians’ speeches, and television dramas not only transmit new messages 
about common public interests, but also create the sense of a wider, listening ‘we’ in 
which the listener partakes. See John R. Bowen, “The Forms Culture Takes: A State-
of-the-Field Essay on the Anthropology of Southeast Asia,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 
54 (1995): p. 1058.  
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problem of making Islamic family law to be a positive law. Given the 
fact that there is a variety of fiqh law in Islamic tradition that may lead 
to uncertainty and ‘disorder’, the government effort to make a unified 
Islamic law was relatively welcomed by Muslims. Nevertheless, another 
question arises not only in terms of how to overcome fiqh differences, 
but also a question as to whether the codified law should conform to 
the international human rights standard. Bowen traces back the history 
of Islamic law and finds that there are two tendencies of reasoning in 
Islamic law: the transcendental and comprehensive. The former is a 
tendency of reasoning that attempts to understand the divine will 
embedded in the Qur’a>n and the H{adi >th that finally lead to a unique 
divine truth, while the latter is an effort to find a social importance of 
developing Islamic rules that can be reached through consensus among 
scholars and/or an accommodation to a political reality. In fact, these 
two tendencies are complimentary. In the Indonesian case, Bowen 
finds that the second tendency seems much more at work in the 
process of making of what is called Compilation of Islamic Law 1991 
that includes marriage law, inheritance and pious trust (waqf). It seems a 
consensus because those who are in charge with this project reportedly 
had interviewed 166 `Ulama>' in ten cities, held seminars and 
workshops attended by professors of religious law, jurists, judges and 
Supreme Court justices. Finally, through a journal called Mimbar 
Hukum, the intellectuals of the Department of Religion argue that the 
Compilation is a product of collective reasoning (ijtihād jamā‘i>).33 
The consensus, however, is still questioned. One of the 
controversies around the Compilation was concerning gender equality 
in inheritance law. Minister of Religion, Munawir Sjazdali and some 
progressive scholars and feminists argue that the Islamic traditional 
idea stipulated in the Qur’a>n that female inheritor gets half of the male 
one should be changed into an equal share. These people develop 
different types of reasonings to support this idea. Some argue through 
historical analysis of Islam in Saudi Arabia and then back to modern 
Indonesia to show the differences and at the same time to argue for 
the equality of man and woman as a general principle of Islam. Others 
look to local custom and argue for an ‘Indonesian sense of justice,’ 
while others invite us to see the discrepancy between discourse and 
practice and the ‘hypocrisy’ of the `Ulama>' who try to maintain the law 
                                                 
33 Bowen, “Legal Reasoning and Public Discourse," p. 83-97. 
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of un-equality but at the same time distribute their property equally 
among their male and female family. Many conservative `Ulama>', 
however, disagree with the proposed change and therefore the 
Compilation still maintains the two-to-one ratio. In addition, the 
Compilation adds another sentence: “the judge must take into account 
the values and the living law among the people.”34   
What is the living law among the people? This question takes us 
into another public reasoning in Bowen’s study, that is, the relationship 
between local custom and Islamic law. In his study of the Gayo people 
of Aceh in North Sumatera, Bowen gives us a very rich account of 
public reasoning inside and outside the court involving the interaction 
between local custom and Islamic law. One of the examples 
demonstrated in the study is the inheritance dispute. According to 
Gayo tradition, any son or daughter who gets married to a person 
outside the village, he or she will not be entitled to the estates left by 
his/her parents. A woman went to Islamic court in 1960s to get a 
share of land controlled by her brother in the village. According to 
Islamic law, the woman can get her share, but the judges tried to avoid 
the contradiction between local norms and Islamic law by arguing that 
there was a consensus regarding the estate some years ago and the 
woman just kept silent (which meant she agreed with decision). Thus, 
there is no point to reopen the case in the court! A similar case, 
however, was judged differently in 1990s. The judges now asked both 
the plaintiff and defendant if there was really a consensus among the 
family and/or if they can make an agreement outside the court. 
Otherwise, the judge will enforce the Islamic norm. This change can 
be understood, Bowen argues, if we look at the socio-political change 
of Gayo land in particular and Indonesia in general. In 1990s, the 
Islamic court had already had the authority to settle inheritance cases 
and there was a Compilation of Islamic Law of 1991 as the reference 
for the court. Furthermore, social mobility of the local people had 
increased during this period and the idea that to be a member of a 
village means to live in the area had gradually diminished. With the 
increase of the central government control of the Islamic court, the 
judges in Gayo land who happened to be the local people, now had 
                                                 
34John R. Bowen, “Qur’an, Justice, Gender: Internal Debates in Indonesian Islamic 
Jurisprudence,” in History of Religion. 38 (1998), pp. 52-78; idem., Islam, Law and Equality 
in Indonesia. 
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been replaced by other people who did not really understand the local 
custom.35 
Another study which tries to analyze Indonesian Islam as it 
appeared in the public sphere is the work of Kenneth M. George.36 
This American scholar pays his attention to a politico-cultural event 
held in 1995 in Jakarta called “Festival Istiqlal 2”. In Arabic, “istiqlal” 
simply means “independence”, but its meaning becomes more 
exclusively Islamic in Indonesian context because it is the name of the 
national mosque in Jakarta. The festival, therefore, was held not only in 
relation to the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesian independence but also 
to the programs of the festival which were focused on Indonesian 
Muslim culture. Unlike “Festival Istiqlal 1” that was held in 1991, this 
second festival has something special called “Al-Qur’an Mushaf 
Istiqlal,” an artistic work of calligraphy of the Qur’a >n consists of 970 
pages, and 123 x 88 centimeter in size.  
George found that the mus}h }af was an important materialization of 
the contest between Islam and the state in the public sphere. As many 
observers indicate, by early 1990s, Suharto shifed his political alliance 
from the nominal Muslims (abangan) and Christians to the Islamic 
groups (santri), especially the reformist one. During his rule, in 
imitation of the Dutch colonial policy, Suharto tried to depoliticize 
Islam and push it strictly to “the cultural corner”. The Mushaf Istiqlal, 
according to George, represents the struggle between Suharto and the 
Islamic groups for realizing their respective agendas. It was clear that 
Suharto wanted to use Islam for his ambition to stay in power, and at 
the same time he never tolerated any ideological ambition of the 
Islamic groups. Therefore, when the president agreed to support the 
festival, he urged that it should be a festival of Indonesian culture 
inspired by Islam. It means that “nationalist aspirations and 
sensibilities had to precede and be served by religious ones”.37  
On the other hand, the artists who made the mus}h}af, tried “to 
summon fort an Indonesian Muslim public around a civic and cultural 
project, and to alert that public to its own spiritual and artistic 
                                                 
35 Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, pp. 89-122. 
36 Kenneth M. George, “Designs on Indonesia’s Muslim Communities,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 57 (1998), pp. 693-713. 
37 Ibid, p. 702. 
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activity”.38 In other words, the artists working for the project did not 
only work to create an aesthetic object, but also and more importantly 
to represent Islam in the Indonesian national public sphere. To do this, 
they tried to include 42 Muslim cultures and design areas of Indonesia, 
and put them together in the margin decoration of the mus }h}af.  The 42 
design areas were certainly arbitrarily decided by the artists, and this 
also triggered criticisms because some areas known as non-Islamic 
regions like Bali, Papua and East Timor were also included.  
The Mushaf Istiqlal, therefore, represents the interests of the state 
as well as the Muslim artists in the public sphere. George then 
concludes that “while the state dominates the public sphere, certain 
figures can exploit its intrusions for their own social, cultural or 
religious ends, and in that sense, find room for manoeuvre even within 
the most repressive political system”.39 Moreover, the mus}h}af case also 
shows us the intricate issue of Islam and the modern nation state. In 
this context, the important question in the Indonesian public sphere, 
said George, is: “What political embrace is to be desired when a nation 
state has designs on its Muslim communities, and those communities 
have designs on the nation-state?”40 
Competing Publics and Variety of Reasonings 
The studies summarised above show us different kinds of analysis 
and focus that may guide us to see if the concept of ‘public sphere’ is a 
useful category to understand Indonesian Islam. One of the obvious 
facts demonstrated in these studies is that there are competing publics 
rather than one single public of bourgeois public sphere introduced by 
Habermas. Geoff Eley argues that there were other important public 
spheres even in the nineteenth century of Europe other than that of 
bourgeois class.41 Nancy Fraser argues further that the existence of 
competing publics, either in stratified or egalitarian multicultural 
societies, is necessary to develop a participatory democracy. This does 
not mean that we “preclude the possibility of an additional, more 
                                                 
38 Ibid, p. 709. 
39 Ibid, p. 710. 
40 Ibid, p. 711. 
41 Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics and Political Cultures: placing Habermas in the 
nineteenth century,” in Nicholas B. Dirks et al. (eds), Culture/Power/History: A Reader in 
Contemporary Social Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).  
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comprehensive arena in which members of different, more limited 
public talks across lines of cultural diversity.”42      
Obviously the existence of the competing Muslim publics supports 
the thesis that new media in the Muslim World leads to a 
fragmentation of religious authority.43 However, far from the 
expectation of these scholars, the above study shows us that the new 
media do not necessarily lead to new lay-interpreters of Islam but on 
the contrary the media help reinforce the existing different religious 
authorities. The figures in DDII, Ja’far Umar Thalib of FKAWJ as well 
as Wahid and Madjid are the Islamic leaders whose authorities have 
been strengthened, rather than weakened by the media. On the other 
hand, in George’s study we find that the artists apparently played more 
significant role in the making of the Mushaf Istiqlal than the `Ulama>'. 
The plurality of publics also urges us to think of the importance of 
the range of participation in the public sphere. Perhaps, the contrast 
between the more simple analysis and scope of Federspiel’s study that 
does not consider sufficiently the voices of the others beyond al-
Muslimun, compared to Liddle’s, Hefner’s and Bowen’s studies, may 
show us at first glance that the idea of public sphere in which people 
interact and argue for or against one another is more helpful to 
understand our object of study. The assumption is, the more 
participants and scope we cover, the more understanding we get.44 
There are at least two types of participants: those who are directly 
                                                 
42 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: a Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy,” in Craig Calhoun (ed), Habermas and the Public Sphere 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 121-28. 
43 Francis Robinson, “Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of 
Print,” Modern Asian Studies, 27 (1993), pp. 229-51; Eickelman and Anderson, 
“Redefining Muslim Publics"; Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining 
the Umma (London: Routledge, 2001).  
44 It is also important to look at various media that are available in Indonesian public 
life. Today, the use of internet has gradually developed among urban middle class. We 
can usually find internet cafés in major cities around the country. There are also some 
Islamic and Christian homepages, besides the non-confessional ones. Visit for 
instance, www.hidayatullah.com; www.islamlib.com; www.gerejakatolik.net; www.ba-
hana-magazine.com. Another popular media –used by Muslims and others alike– is 
VCD. We can find a lot of VCDs on religious music, preaches, and Muslim-Christian 
tensions. Last, but not least, almost all TV stations in Indonesia have an Islamic 
preaching program, which is usually broadcasted in the morning. These are certainly 
interesting resources for scholarly research on Indonesian Islam.  
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involved in debates and discussions as writers or speakers; and those 
who just read and listen to the former. If we look at Indonesian 
statistics, we can assume that during and after Suharto period (Liddle’s, 
Hefner’s, Bowen’s and George’s studies) there had been likely more 
participants than that of Sukarno period (Federspiel’s study) because of 
educational improvement in the former period.  Hefner, with reference 
to Gavin W. Jones and Chris Manning mentions that the basic literacy 
skill of young adults sharply increased from 40 percent in 1965 to 90 
percent in 1990s.45 There was also a dramatic increase of the number 
of people completing senior high school from 4 percent in 1970 to 
more than 30 percent in 1990. 
However, even the studies focused on the Suharto period and 
afterwards have different degrees of participant-coverage. Both 
Hefner’s and Liddle’s studies, for instance, mostly focus on intellectual 
Muslim discourses and politics in Jakarta.46 According to some recent 
critiques of Hefner’s Civil Islam, this study even pays more attention to 
the elite intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman 
Wahid and thereby overlooks the gap and differences between these 
figures and their colleagues inside and outside their organizations.47  
We may assume that Jakarta national elites have more significant 
influence on politics and publics, but it does not mean that the ideas 
and politics developing in the outer islands are not significant at all.  
                                                 
45 Hefner,“Civic Pluralism Denied?," p. 163. 
46 The limit of the scope can also be found in terms of Media Dakwah circulation. The 
magazine only had a limited license called STT (Surat Tanda Terdaftar), not the general 
publishing license called SIUPP (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Press). This means that it is 
not allowed to distribute the magazine for general sale. It can only be distributed 
among a limited circle such as members of an organization. Media Dakwah finally 
obtained the SIUPP in February 1998 due to the help of—as it was widely believed—
General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s son in law. See Hefner “Print Islam," p. 91;  
idem., Civil Islam, p. 253 and note 37). Thus, by the time of Liddle’s and Hefner’s 
studies, the circulation of the magazine was very limited.  For Media Dakwah, Hefner 
estimates about sixteen to eighteen thousand copies per issue and about twenty five 
thousand copies for a hot issue. This number is very low compared to a more recent 
achievement of bimonthly Sabili, another Islamist magazine that reached 80 thousand 
copies in the year 2000 and even 100 thousand copies in 2001 per issue. See 
Muhammad, “Jihad Lewat Tulisan." 
47 Martin van Bruinessen, “The Threat to ‘Smiling Islam,’” Times Literary Supplement 
(October 12, 2001), p. 27; John T. Sidel, “‘It Takes a Madrasah?’: Habermas Meets 
Bourdieu in Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, 9 (2001), pp. 109-22. 
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Nevertheless, Bowen’s studies, to some extent, have filled this gap 
through his analysis of the views of both national Jakarta-based 
intellectuals and politicians and local figures in Gayo region. Unlike the 
other studies, Bowen also includes women voices in his discussion. In 
this regard, I think that Bowen’s scope of study can be extended 
further to non-Muslim groups, especially the Christians whose 
positions and views are important to consider, especially those issues 
involving both religious groups. Bowen for instance argues that recent 
development of Islamic law in Indonesia has strengthened religious 
boundaries in society, especially between Muslims and Christians.48 His 
account, however, only gives us mostly on Muslim side, not the other. 
In fact, the problems of inter-religious marriage and the controversy 
on Marriage Law 1974 for instance, have been very much discussed 
and debated among Christians as well (not to mention the recent 
Education Law and the Inter-Religious Harmony Law draft).49 This 
extended scope will not only help us understand the internal 
reasonings (to use Bowen’s term) within each religious groups on the 
same issue, but also may assist us to see how these groups talk in a 
common arena where they should resolve the conflicts and differences. 
Another important point is that the competing publics described in 
the studies have tried to support their respective positions by 
developing a certain type of argument that to a certain degree can be 
considered rational. But, it is not a pure rationality in Kantian sense 
(followed by Habermas) to which everybody is assumed will submit if 
he or she relies solely on reason.50 The reason is, as Hefner and Bowen 
argue, Indonesian Muslims look to their religious traditions to 
formulate their ideas. This is why Bowen prefers using the term 
“reasoning” to “reason.” Thus, we may say that this type of reasoning 
                                                 
48 Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, pp. 229-52.  
49 Bowen wrongly says that “A law on ‘inter-religious harmony (kerukunan antar-agama) 
recently has been under parliamentary discussion” and that the joint decree of 
Ministers of Religion and Interior forbidding any effort to convert people who had 
already adhered to one of the recognized religions was issued in 1970. See  Bowen, 
Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia, p. 239. The inter-religious harmony law has not 
been brought to parliament discussion yet (although it has been discussed both in the 
Department of Religion and Christian and Muslim media) and the joint decree was 
issued not in 1970 but in 1979. 
50 Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun 
(ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), p. 2.  
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is different from Charles Taylor’s notion that when people discuss 
common interest in the public sphere they will not refer to any 
metaphysical concepts transcending contemporary common action.51 
Nevertheless, the absence of radical secularity (to use Taylor’s term) in 
Indonesian Muslim debates, according to Hefner and Bowen, does not 
necessarily mean that they are not concerned with common interest of 
the public. In this regard, Bowen’s analysis of different reasonings by 
different publics shows us that his understanding of Islamic traditions 
on methods of reasonings is very significant. Instead of drawing a 
simple and common dichotomy between traditionalist and reformist or 
substantialist and scripturalist, based on his knowledge of fiqh tradition, 
Bowen can explore deeply the complexities and differences among 
Muslim public reasonings. 
Last but not least, the above studies show us that the state, 
especially the military, is a very important variable behind the public 
discursive contestations. This fact seems to lead Hefner to argue that 
civil society cannot smoothly develop without the support of a civil 
state. Thus, public sphere as a domain for the development of civil 
society cannot be sharply separated from the state as such. Based on 
certain political circumstances, Suharto regime had supported directly 
or indirectly either Madjid’s group or Media Dakwah’s group. George’s 
study of the Mushaf Istiqlal illustrates another important point, namely 
that even under the Suharto’s authoritarian regime, which strictly tried 
to control the whole society, there was still a space where the Muslims 
could represent their interests in the public sphere. 
In this regard, it is probably interesting to look at Fraser’s theory of 
strong and weak publics. Publics are strong if they are involved in both 
formation opinion and decision making process and considered weak 
if they are involved only in opinion formation. Parliament is a good 
example of a strong public. Fraser also considers self-managing 
institutions as strong publics if they become the arenas of both 
opinion formation and decision making.52 This theory may help us 
understand better when a certain issue becomes a discursive 
contestation in the public sphere in Indonesia. For instance, the 
controversies on Marriage Law and Education Law in Indonesia that 
                                                 
51 Charles Taylor, “Modernity and the Rise of the Public Sphere,” The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, 14 (1993), pp. 203-60. 
52 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere," pp. 134-5. 
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finally led to a certain type of decision (favouring Muslim majority but 
at the same time compromising Christian minority) might be best 
understood through this theory.    
Conclusion    
Having discussed the relevant studies on Islam and the public 
sphere in Indonesia and analysed them through some scholarly 
discussions on this issue, we may conclude that it can be fruitfully used 
and developed for further research. The idea of public sphere urges us 
to cover more participants who are involved in discussing a public 
issue. This will include both national and regional figures with different 
statuses and religious backgrounds. This wider coverage will also urge 
us to learn the relevant Islamic traditions in order to have a better 
understanding of the variety of reasonings within the competing 
publics.  
Our analysis of the studies also shows us that there are differences 
between Habermas’ understanding of public sphere and its application 
in the studies of Indonesian Islam. Habermas’ notion of a single, 
rational and secular public sphere is certainly different from the public 
sphere described in the above studies which is plural and still within 
the domain of Islamic reasonings. The studies also illustrate that the 
widespread of media in Indonesia has led to more fragmented religious 
authorities but at the same time also strengthened the existing religious 
authorities. I a few cases, we also find the emergence of non-`Ulama >' 
as the speakers of Islam. Finally, the studies also reveal the intricacy of 
the relationships between the state and the public sphere. Rather than 
making a clear-cut line between the two, it will be more useful to look 
at the dynamic interactions between them. In fact, the socio political 
forces operating in the public sphere are not the simple dichotomy of 
state and society, but there are different local, national, and 
international forces, which influence the public sphere.[] 
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